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Out of the Kashmiri Íaivite school of non-dualism which follows the Bhairava Tantras, 
whose adepts often devoted themselves to extreme Tantric practices, there arose "an 
extraordinary series of works and masters that between the ninth and twelfth centuries 
constituted one of the highest achievements of Indian speculation and spirituality of all 
time". One of these masters is Utpaladeva, and the Áßvarapratyabhijñåkårikå is his most 
important work. Utpaladeva, following in the footsteps of his teacher Somånanda, finds a 
place for his tradition of thought ("Pratyabhijñå") among the philosophical schools, by 
presenting its doctrines in a rational way, and entering into discussion with the other Indian 
schools of thought.1 
 The transition is remarkable, and Torella comments on it as follows (p. XII-XIII): 
"This ‘school’ ... would probably have been destined to remain one of the many Kashmiri 
schools whose names we hardly know and whose outlines are blurred, had it not been for 
the development, mainly within it, of the first seeds of what was to become the flowering of 
an extraordinary series of works and masters ... [as above]. The complex work of exegesis 
of the scriptures, the reformulation of their teaching and the organizing and hierarchizing of 
their contents indicate first and foremost its decision to emerge into the open, to escape 
from the dimension of a restricted circle of adepts — which is what must have been the 
original nature of these schools — ... . In order to do this it was necessary to extract a 
homogeneous though varied teaching from the diverse texts; to purge it, without changing 
its essential nature, of all that it was felt could not be proposed to a wider circle — in other 
words, of all that was bound to create an instinctive and insurmountable resistance — by 
attenuating the sharper [604] points or removing every actually concrete aspect, and finally 
translating it into a discourse whose categories were shared by its addressees and engaging 
in a dialogue that would not be afraid to confront rival doctrines." 
                                                
*  Raffaele Torella: The Áßvarapratyabhijñåkårikå of Utpaladeva with the author's V®tti. Critical edition and 
annotated translation. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. 1994. (Serie Orientale Roma, 
LXXI.) 
1 Cp. Utpaladeva's remark in the V®tti on kårikå IV.16: "I have here furnished a logical justification of this 
path" (p. 218; Sanskrit p. 80). 
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 The Pratyabhijñå school demonstrates, through its transition, how strong must have 
been the attraction to join the rational tradition that had united, at least since the beginning 
of the common era, a variety of mutually opposing schools of thought in India. 
Brahmanical thinkers, Buddhists and Jainas had opposed and sometimes viciously attacked 
each other, without ever desisting from paying heed to each other, and trying to defend their 
own points of view against the attacks directed against them. The very existence of such a 
rational tradition in India has never received the attention it deserves, and it goes without 
saying that not all religious movements chose to be part of it. Pratyabhijñå is an example of 
a school which originally remained aloof from these discussions, but — in the persons of 
Somånanda, Utpaladeva and others — felt the need to join in. One of the results is the 
Áßvarapratyabhijñåkårikå. 
 The Áßvarapratyabhijñåkårikå is "a purely theoretical and rigorously argumented 
work, though based on a scriptural background". Its main opponent is Buddhism, esp. the 
Buddhist logicians. Here Torella observes: "This lengthy examination and criticism of the 
teaching of the Buddhist logicians resulted in, or at least was accompanied by, the peculiar 
phenomenon of a more or less conscious absorption of their doctrines and their 
terminology, that was to leave substantial traces in the structure of the Pratyabhijñå" (p. 
XXII). However, I do not think that this phenomenon is all that peculiar. It is the 
unavoidable outcome of a rational tradition that its participants will be influenced by each 
other, even borrow from each other, in spite of whatever fundamental differences may 
oppose them. Pratyabhijñå could remain "pure" as long as it did not try to show that the 
Buddhists were wrong. The moment they entered into discussion, their "purity" could not 
but be the first victim. This general observation leaves, of course, place for the possibility 
that Utpaladeva borrowed from the Buddhist logicians "to increase his own prestige by 
assuming the ways and forms of a philosophical school which was perhaps the most 
respected and feared, even by the many who did not agree with it", as Torella suggests. 
 Another author who has exerted a strong influence on Pratyabhijñå is Bhart®hari, as 
Torella points out in the Introduction (p. XXIII f.). Here he makes the interesting 
observation that this author, who was still severely [605] criticized by Somånanda, has 
become a major inspirer for Utpaladeva. It is from Bhart®hari that Utpaladeva borrows — 
or rather: adapts — the concept of vimarßa, which for him is "the spark that causes this 
luminous structure [of prakåßa] to pulsate by introducing self-awareness, dynamism, 
freedom of intervention, of self-assertion, thus expressing in theoretical terms what is the 
nature of an unpredictable divine personality". Bhart®hari's teaching on the all-pervasive 
power of the word furnished, moreover, an argument in the dispute against the Buddhist 
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logicians, one of whose basic theses was precisely the absolute otherness of direct sensation 
from determinate knowledge (p. XXV). Again we see that a school can only enter a rational 
tradition at a price: it may not be able to resist for long the intrusion of foreign elements. 
 Utpaladeva himself wrote two commentaries on his Áßvarapratyabhijñåkårikå, the 
short V®tti and the long Viv®ti. The former is here edited along with the 
Áßvarapratyabhijñåkårikå. Both had been edited before (see Bibliographic note, p. XLV). 
The earlier edition of the V®tti (in the Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, no. XXXIV, 
Srinagar 1921) was not however complete. The present edition is based on nine Mss, one of 
which (T) comes from Kerala and is in Malayalam characters. It is the only Ms which 
contains the full text of the V®tti.2 Of the remaining eight Mss, which are all in Íåradå and 
can be shown to belong to one group, one (J) stands out in having a considerable amount of 
readings identical with, or sometimes similar to, those only found in the Ms from Kerala. 
This information allows Torella to outline a stemma codicum of the Mss, which is the basis 
of his edition.3 
 Another important source of information for the readings of the V®tti is the 
Áßvarapratyabhijñåviv®tivimarßin¥ of Abhinavagupta, "which sometimes quotes literally, 
sometimes paraphrases or simply gives the contents of the V®tti" (p. XLVIII). The editor 
has decided to include the information derived from that text in the critical apparatus. Users 
of his edition will be grateful for this. 
 The Sanskrit text — which covers 81 pages — has been meticulously edited, and is 
printed in Devanagari script. This fact, which will certainly be [606] welcomed especially 
by Indian scholars, may nonetheless be responsible for some misprints. The ones that I 
noticed have been collected in the Appendix. An English translation follows (pp. 83-219), 
which is reliable and competent. It is also extremely helpful, for the Sanskrit text is not easy 
to read. The style is condensed, and it is not always clear where and when an opponent 
suddenly takes over. 
 Users of the book will be particularly impressed by the notes to the translation, 
which often cover half or more of the pages concerned, and which are a veritable mine of 
information on any number of issues dealt with by Utpaladeva. References to Buddhist and 
Brahmanical authors, discussions of the way Abhinavagupta deals with this or that 
problem, etc., add greatly to the value of this book. Equally informative is the Introduction, 
                                                
2 Note 2 on pp. LIII-LIV contains "a very instructive story", which I strongly recommend to all those who 
wish to use Mss written in scripts they do not know. 
3 The critical apparatus frequently uses the abbreviation E, whose meaning does not appear to be explained in 
the book. 
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which covers 46 pages. A page of Abbreviations (unfortunately not strictly alphabetical), a 
Bibliography, an Index of important words in the text, and a general Index conclude this 
work, which will no doubt remain the standard edition of Utpaladeva's text. 
 A few relatively minor points concerning the translation may here be mentioned. 
Some compounds in -vapus and -rËpa are translated with the verb "inform": vågvapu˙ 
(kårikå I.6.1) becomes "informed by the word" (p. 128); paråvågrËpatvåt  (V®tti on k. I.6.1) 
"since the word that informs it is the supreme word"; pËrvånubhavarËpa (k. I.6.9) "is 
informed by a former perception" (p. 134). In such cases "form°" rather than "inform°" may 
have been intended . 
 The V®tti on kårikå I.7.10 reads (p. 35): pradeße∑v ålokapËraµ santamase m®dum 
u∑ˆådikaµ sparßam vå gha†arËpasparßåbhåvåtmakam anubhËyålokådi gha†åbhåvo 'tråsti, 
gha†o nåst¥ti vyavahartuµ yuktam. The central part of this sentence is: ålokådi "..." 
vyavahartuµ yuktam. Torella translates this (p. 144): "The verbal formulation and relative 
behaviour (vyavahartum) ‘...’ can be legitimately brought about by sight or another sense 
(ålokådi)". This can hardly be correct. The fact that a footnote specifies "that here the word 
åloka is used in the same sentence first in the sense of ‘light’, then in that of ‘sight’", hardly 
improves the situation. Nor is there any reference to Abhinavagupta or any other authority 
that might justify this interpretation. I am not in a position to give a final interpretation to 
this sentence, but something along the following lines would seem to be worth considering: 
"It is legitimate to treat light and [touch] as ‘there is the absence of the jar on this [surface], 
there is no jar’, once one has directly [607] perceived in the places in question a beam of 
light or, in the case of darkness, a soft and warm etc. tactile sensation constituting in the 
first case the absence of the shape of the jar, and in the second of its tangible form." The 
fact that the beam of light is said to constitute the absence of the shape of the jar, would 
seem to justify that it is legitimate to treat light in the manner described. (The case of touch 
is analogous.) Further confirmation appears to come from the V®tti on the immediately 
following kårikå I.7.11, which Torella translates as follows: "On the basis of what has been 
said, the fact that light is a different thing from the pißåca does not entail the negation of its 
presence (na ... pißåcani∑edhaprasa∫ga) within the light. The pißåca is, in fact, invisible and, 
though it is different from the light, it can reside within the light, in the same way in which 
it can without any difficulty also reside within a ball of clay." Here, then, it is not legitimate 
to treat light as "there is the absence of a pißåca here, there is no pißåca", and nor does light 
in this case constitute the absence of a pißåca. 
 The translation is sometimes rather free, and this is often necessary in order to make 
a difficult passage intelligible. Occasionally, however, the free translation would seem to 
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make the text even more difficult to understand. An example is the translation of kårikås 
II.3.8 and 9, which reads as follows (p. 168-169): "8. Faced with a non-specific 
manifestation of ‘fire’ etc., a single means of knowledge knows what the outcome or cause 
of it is, its being hot, its being able to be denoted by this or that word and so on. 9. On the 
contrary, it happens differently in the case of the activity that starts at that moment in the 
subject who aims at producing certain effects, as regards a particular, individual object, 
differentiated by various, specific sensations of place etc., and also [in the case of that 
activity promoted] by inference." The translation of kårikå 8 is free, but seems to give the 
meaning of the original. The intention of kårikå 9 is however difficult to grasp on the basis 
of this translation. A comparison with the Sanskrit shows that the part "it happens 
differently in the case of" does not translate anything at all. Yet these added words render 
the meaning of the original obscurer than it is. Kårikå 9 reads, in Sanskrit (p. 52): så tu 
deßådikådhyak∑åntarabhinne svalak∑aˆe/ tåtkålik¥ prav®tti˙ syåd arthino 'py anumånata˙//. 
The initial så is puzzling, yet something like the following translation seems possible: "But 
immediate activity with regard to a particular, individual object, differentiated by various 
specific sensations of place etc., may take place in [608] the case of someone who aims at 
producing certain effects4; also as a result of inference." 
 Óhnika I.3 contains, primarily in the V®tti, a number of derivatives of what would 
seem to be the causative of the root vid. They are: vedaka (kårikå 1), saµvedikå (V®tti on k. 
1), saµvedana (V®tti on k. 2), vedana (V®tti on k. 2), asaµvedyamåna (V®tti on k. 3). Some 
of these forms may be ambiguous, in that they may express a non-causative meaning, but 
surprisingly Torella translates them all as if they express no causative meaning. Yet a 
causative meaning would seem to fit all the contexts. Kårikå 1 speaks of the "form of 
cognition which is memory" (sm®tijñåna), and states that it is not ådyånubhavavedaka. 
Torella translates "does not know the original perception", but "does not make known the 
original perception" would seem to be preferable. The V®tti explains, in Torella's 
translation: "Memory, though arising from the reawakening of the latent impression 
deposited by the former perception, because it is restricted to itself exclusively, knows only 
its own form (svarËpasaµvedikaiva)." I would prefer "makes only its own form known", 
for unlike the Buddhists, Utpaladeva certainly does not look upon knowledge, or cognition, 
or memory, as the subject or agent of the activity of knowing. This is confirmed by the use 
of the word jñapti "cognitive act" in the V®tti on kårikå 2. This word betrays its causative 
meaning by its form; it is derived from jñapayati, which is the causative of jñå "to know". 
                                                
4 This translates arthino. The corresponding expression tadarthitayå in the commentary seems to have been 
overlooked in the translation. 
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And indeed, the word occurs in the sentence sarvå hi jñapti˙ 
svasaµvedanaikarËpånanyasaµvidvedyå, rËparasajñånayor anyonyavedane 
'nyonyavi∑ayavedanam api syåt. This means no doubt: "For every cognitive act makes by 
nature only itself known, and is not made known by another cognition: if the cognition of 
shape could make known the cognition of taste and vice versa, then the one would make 
known the object of the other." Torella translates all this in a non-causative manner ("is ... 
only aware of itself", "does not become the object of another cognition", etc.), but this may 
have to be corrected. Perhaps the clinching case is the word asaµvedyamåna in the V®tti on 
kårikå I.3.3, which cannot but be a causative form. Yet Torella translates, in keeping with 
his earlier translations, "which are not experienced", where something like "which are not 
made known" would be required. 
[609] 
 The V®tti on kårikå IV.3 contains the following sentence: pratyagåtmåno bahava˙, 
te∑u pramåt®rËpe∑u maheßvareˆa svånanda˙ svakriyaikakart®tånusåriˆ¥ nirmitå. Torella 
translates (p. 211): "The individual selves are many; in them — who are manifested as 
knowing subjects — Maheßvara creates his own beatitude and activity, which are 
themselves inherent in the only real agency." The last part of this translation is problematic, 
for ekakart®tånusåriˆ¥ nirmitå is feminine singular, and qualifies only svakriyå. Two ways 
are open from here. One might think that the context requires that "and" be supplied; after 
all, the kårikå has dual kriyånandau. In that case the translation becomes something like: "in 
them [reside Maheßvara's] own beatitude [and] his own activity which Maheßvara has 
created following (°anusåriˆ¥) his single agency". However, another (and probably better) 
interpretation can be proposed in the light of the V®tti on kårikå IV.6, which says (p. 212): 
"In the Lord, the infinite agency (°kart®tå)... is called activity (kriyå) and consists of 
supreme light and beatitude (°ånandamay¥)." This allows us not to supply "and" in the 
sentence under consideration, and to translate: "The individual selves are many; in them ... 
Maheßvara has created his activity, which is his beatitude and which follows his single 
agency." 
 
 In Section IV the contrast between God's creation and the mental elaboration 
(vikalpa(na)) of the individual is dealt with. Here one reads, among other things: "The 
things that constitute this universe, which are to Maheßvara ... indicated by the meaning of 
the word ‘this’ ..., without the connection with [or: the consideration of] the conventional 
linguistic expression ‘this’ coming into play, those very things appear — since they were 
created thus by God — as particular realities (svalak∑aˆa°) insofar as they have the same 
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substratum as several manifestations, and in many forms insofar as they are universals each 
taken singly." (p. 213).5 Against this kårikå 8 observes: "On the contrary, in the individual 
subject, those entities that are manifested separately become the object of mental 
elaboration (prakalpyå˙) in the sphere of memory, imagination and so on, and have a 
variety of distinct names." (p. 213-214). The V®tti adds: "The entities that are manifested 
separately, that is, the universals, are shown by the limited [610] subjects — thanks to the 
power of mental elaboration (vikalpanaßaktyå) — as the object of inner reflective 
awareness through various names such as ‘jar’, ‘silvery’, ‘white’, ‘cloth’, ‘cart’ and so on. 
... It is precisely this manifestation of a differentiation between perceiving subject and 
object perceived, substantiated by the word, which constitutes the bond of the saµsåra in 
the limited soul." (p. 214). Kårikås 9 and 10 continue: "The creation that pertains to him 
(i.e., the individual subject, JB) is not common [to other subjects] and is dependent on the 
creation of the Lord. It occurs in the limited subject — essentially identical to the Lord — 
in virtue of the very power of the Lord ... coinciding with the activity of mental elaboration 
(vikalpakriyayå)." (p. 214-215). Finally kårikå 11: "The creation of the Lord may be 
common or not common to all subjects, manifesting itself [in both cases] in all clarity. With 
the suppression of the mental constructs (vikalpa), resulting from concentration on a single 
point, the plane of the Lord is gradually reached." (p. 215). 
 These extracts raise the question what exactly is meant by the "creation" pertaining 
to the limited subject, and by their "mental elaboration". Note 20 on p. 215 proposes the 
following answer: "... also the limited subject possesses an innate power of creation which 
is in essence no different from that of the Lord, since the individual himself is essentially 
identical to the Lord although he ignores or has forgotten this identity. This power of 
creation, limited by non-awareness, remains restricted to the individual sphere: what is 
created are images, feelings, ideas etc., which depend more (as in the case of memory) or 
less (as in fantasy) on the objects in the phenomenal world created by the Lord. These two 
kinds of objects and of creations are distinguished by being the last ‘common to all 
subjects’, the others are ‘not common’ i.e. not able to be experienced except by the limited 
subject who creates them. But the power of creation is essentially the same." This is no 
doubt correct, but raises another question. Kårikå 11 states that mental constructs must be 
suppressed in order to reach liberation (for this is what it is all about). Does this merely 
mean that the individual must suppress memory and fantasy? Does this suffice for 
becoming liberated? Are only memory and fantasy "the bond of the saµsåra in the limited 
                                                
5 I deviate somewhat from Torella's translation ("insofar as they have the same substratum as several 
manifestations" does not occur in it), in order to bring out the parallelism. 
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soul"? The answer must quite evidently be negative. For God's creation, as we have seen, is 
"without the connection with [or: the consideration of] the conventional linguistic 
expression ‘this’ coming into play". The objects in the creation of the limited soul, on the 
other hand, [611] "have a variety of distinct names". There is here obviously more at stake 
than just memory and fantasy, viz. a specific way of looking at the world which is 
determined by "names", i.e. by language. This is precisely what is stated in kårikå 13: "The 
liberated soul looks at the ‘common’ cognizable reality as being undifferentiated from 
himself, like Maheßvara; the bound soul, on the contrary, looks at it as absolutely 
differentiated."6 
 This liberating knowledge — essentially knowledge without "mental elaboration" 
(vikalpa, vikalpana, prakalpa) — is close to the kind of liberating knowledge that had come 
to prevail in Buddhism. In Brahmanism an altogether different kind of knowledge was 
usually looked upon as leading to liberation: the knowledge of the true nature of the self. 
How is this difference to be explained? 
 This question leads us to the topic of the self as agent. It is impossible to deny that 
this topic is quite central to the Áßvarapratyabhijñåkårikå. Verse 2 of the Upodghåta, i.e. the 
first one after the introductory verse, speaks of the Self (svåtman) which is agent (kart®) as 
well as cognizer (jñåt®), and the notion comes back again and again in the text. Seen from 
the perspective of earlier Indian philosophy, this is surprising. To see why this is so, it will 
be useful to recall some fundamental notions of the earlier period. Liberation from the 
effects of karma is an aim shared by most Indian philosophical and religious currents. One 
way to obtain this kind of liberation, advocated in one form or another by various schools 
of thought, consists in the realization of the true nature of the self. In these schools the real 
self does not participate in the activities of body and mind. By realizing that one is different 
from everything that acts, and that one is identical with something (the self) that is not 
active, one becomes separate from one's actions, and therefore also from the results of these 
actions. 
 It is not possible, nor indeed necessary, here to prove the correctness of the above 
observations.7 The classical school of philosophy which illustrates them most clearly is 
Såµkhya, with its absolute distinction between the inactive soul (often called puru∑a) and 
material nature (prak®ti, pradhåna) which is active. Practically all schools of Brahmanical 
                                                
6 Utpaladeva's idea about liberation is similar to Bhart®hari's, but he manages to avoid a contradiction that 
marred the latter's position. I will discuss this issue in a forthcoming article "Indology and rationality". 
7 Bronkhorst, 1993: ch. 5. 
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philosophy looked [612] upon the soul as a non-agent. Indeed, insight into its non-active 
nature is, in most schools, an essential precondition for liberation. 
 Utpaladeva takes a diametrically opposite position. He explicitly rejects the 
Såµkhya position for not attributing agency to the self. Consider the following passage:8 
"Those who do possess pure consciousness but not the agency to the highest degree 
(uttamakart®tå) are created by the Lord as separate, distinct from the self, due to their being 
devoid of agency. Though having the same characteristics — consciousness etc. — these 
subjects are differentiated from one another because of a particular will of the Lord: they 
are the Vijñånakevalas. (V®tti:) This class of subjects, corresponding more or less to the 
puru∑as of the Såµkhya, has the name of Vijñånakevala." Why does Utpaladeva take this 
position? 
 One factor that has been at work in this fundamental reversal can be identified.9 It is 
related to another problem that occupied the minds of practically all thinkers of classical 
India. One might call it the problem of the origin of objects. This problem does not 
primarily concerns the creation of the world or the like, but rather, more prosaically, the 
interpretation of sentences of the type "he makes a mat" or "the pot comes into being". 
Statements like these were considered problematic, because there is no mat while it is being 
made, and nor is there a pot while it comes into being. The problem is related to an 
underlying presupposition, which I have studied in some other publications and which I 
have baptized "correspondence principle".10 It assumes that the words of a sentence 
correspond to the entities that constitute the situation described by that sentence. This 
principle led to various difficulties, which we cannot discuss here. The problem of 
origination, however, was particularly prominent among them, and was dealt with by 
thinkers belonging to all schools of thought — including Buddhist and Jaina ones —. All of 
them offered their own solution to this problem, and the list of the solutions proposed is 
quite impressive. The [613] solution that concerns us here is the satkåryavåda, the doctrine 
according to which the effect exists already before it is produced. This position may not 
agree with our common sense, but it does solve the problem of "he makes a mat". This 
statement now describes a situation in which there is "he", the activity of making, and 
indeed the mat, for the mat exists already before it has been made. And in "the pot comes 
                                                
8 Kårikås III.2.6-7, with a line from the V®tti (p. 199-200; Sanskrit p. 67-68). 
9 The fact that God, for Utpaladeva, is free (svatantra), and that Påˆini defines the agent as the one that is free 
(P. 1.4.54: svatantra˙ kartå), though alluded to from time to time — e.g. kårikå I.5.14 with V®tti — cannot but 
be a subsidiary reason to explain the reversal under consideration. 
10 See Bronkhorst, 1996. 
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into being", there is already a pot before it has come into being; the word "pot" refers to this 
already existing pot. 
 The Vedåntin Ía∫kara is one of those who deal with the problem, concentrating on 
the statement "the pot comes into being" (gha†a utpadyate). Consider the following 
passage:11 
 
If the effect did not exist prior to its coming into being, the coming into being would 
be without agent and empty. For coming into being is an activity, and must therefore 
have an agent, like [such activities] as going etc. It would be contradictory to say 
that something is an activity, but has no agent. It could be thought that the coming 
into being of a pot, [though] mentioned, would not have the pot as agent, but rather 
something else. ... If that were true, one would say "the potter and other causes come 
into being" instead of "the pot comes into being". In the world however, when one 
says "the pot comes into being" no one understands that also the potter etc. come 
into being; for [these] are understood to have already come into being. 
 
Ía∫kara accepts the satkåryavåda as the solution to the problem: the pot is already there 
before it has come into being, and that is how it can come into being. 
 Having looked at this passage, let us now turn to some passages in Utpaladeva's 
text. We will see that he, too, finds statements of the type "he makes a mat" and "the pot 
comes into being" problematic. His solution is however somewhat different from the 
satkåryavåda illustrated above. The problem is dealt with in Section II chapter IV of the 
book under review (p. 175 ff.; Sanskrit text p. 55 ff.). We read there (kårikå 2) that "an 
insentient [614] reality does not have [the] power ... to confer existence on something that 
is not. Therefore, the relation of cause and effect (kåryakåraˆatå) is essentially reduced to 
that of agent and object of the action (kart®karmatva°)." The V®tti explains "insentient 
reality" with "whether it is primordial matter (pradhåna°) or atoms or seed" 
(pradhånaparamåˆub¥jådi). This shows that Utpaladeva disagrees with the Såµkhyas, the 
most important representatives of satkåryavåda within the Brahmanical tradition, for whom 
primordial matter (pradhåna) is the ultimate cause of all there is (except, of course, the 
selves). It also shows that — in a statement like "the seed causes/produces the shoot" — he 
refuses to consider the seed the real cause of the shoot. Instead, the real Self, which is the 
Lord (¥ßvara), is the real agent, and the object is not created by him, but merely made to 
                                                
11 Ía∫kara ad BrahmasËtra 2.1.18: pråg utpatteß ca kåryasyåsattve utpattir akart®kå niråtmikå ca syåt/ utpattiß 
ca nåma kriyå, så sakart®kaiva bhavitum arhati gatyådivat/ kriyå ca nåma syåd akart®kå ceti viprati∑idhyeta/ 
gha†asya cotpattir ucyamånå na gha†akart®kå, kiµ tarhy anyakart®kå iti kalpyå syåt/ .../ tathå ca sati gha†a 
utpadyate ity ukte kulålåd¥ni kåraˆåni utpadyante ity uktaµ syåt/ na ca loke gha†otpattir ity ukte kulålåd¥nåm 
apy utpadyamånatå prat¥yate/ utpannatåprat¥te˙/. This passage has already been dealt with in Bronkhorst, 
1996. 
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become the object of the senses:12 "Attributing the nature of existent to what does not exist 
is contradictory, and it is already established in what exists. [The relation of cause and 
effect consists in this:] a thing, already present within [the I], is ‘created’ by the Lord, or in 
other words, is caused by him to become the object of knowledge for the internal and 
external senses." And again:13 "At the moment of the original creation, as in the course of 
everyday reality, Maheßvara, by virtue of the power of måyå, by entering the body etc. 
conceived of as self, creates the [limited] knower and thanks to the power of agent 
(kart®ßaktyå) gradually renders the various objects that shine within him externally 
manifest. Creating is precisely rendering manifest in this way." In kårikås and their V®tti 
following II.4.4 Utpaladeva explains that "[t]he entity which is [first] internal with respect 
to another, once it has become external is to be understood as the effect of that other" 
(kårikå 6), and cause "is only the knowing subject" (k. 7). And therefore "Parameßvara is 
taken as efficient cause as regards the shoot" (k. 8). Even in the case of a statement like "the 
potter makes a pot", the potter, though sentient, is not the real agent, for "the potter 
produces the jar through a whole series of operations to which he subjects the clay etc., 
following the rule determined by the Lord" (k. 9).14 All this means that in the statement 
[615] "the potter makes a pot", the word "potter" refers to God, the real agent, and "pot" to 
something that initially shines within God and becomes subsequently manifest. 
Manifestations that are internal — we learn from kårikå I.8.6 — are one with the knowing 
subject (pramåtraikya), and therefore ultimately with God. The word "pot" in "the potter 
makes a pot" refers therefore the to internal manifestation of the pot, and ultimately to God 
himself. Either way there is something it refers to, and the correspondence principle is 
satisfied. 
 What about such activities as becoming, or coming into being, as in "the pot comes 
into being"? The answer is given in the V®tti on kårikå II.4.20:15 "an insentient reality 
cannot even be the agent of the action of being — ‘it is, it becomes’ — since it does not 
possess the freedom that is manifested through ‘wanting to be/become’ (bubhË∑åyogena). 
Thus the ultimate truth in this regard is that the knowing subject, and he alone, ‘causes’ the 
insentient reality ‘to be/become’ (bhåvayati), or, in other words, appears in various forms 
                                                
12 V®tti on kårikå II.4.3-4 (p. 176). The Sanskrit (p. 55, one but last line) reads incorrectly siddhasyauvå°, 
which must be siddhasyaivå°. 
13 V®tti on kårikå I.6.7 (p. 133-134, modified; Sanskrit p. 29). 
14 In note 18 on p. 151-152 Torella refers to Somånanda, according to whom "the jar is produced by the potter 
but only insofar as his creativity is contained within the all-pervading creativity of the Lord". 
15 V®tti on kårikå II.4.20 (p. 187). I translate the Sanskrit verb bhË (p. 61) "to become, come into being" as 
well as "to be". The verb is used thus elsewhere in the same text, e.g., kårikå I.2.10: tatra tatra sthite tat tad 
bhavat[i] "The various things come into being in concomitance with the presence of certain other things". 
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such as mount Himåcala and so on." Even though Torella translates this sentence as if only 
‘being’ is involved, I believe that it may also cover ‘becoming’. In other words, the pot 
does not exist as external object before it comes into being,16 and internal manifestations 
cannot have causal efficiency (arthakriyå), again according to kårikå I.8.6. It is rather the 
knowing subject, which is the Lord, that appears (bhavati!) in that form and is referred to 
by the word "pot". The Lord is therefore the agent of being as well as of becoming; this is 
precisely what we read in the V®tti on kårikå I.5.14, where the property of bhavanakart®tå is 
ascribed to the supreme Self (paramåtman; from kårikå 13). If bhavanakart®tå belongs to 
the supreme Self, it follows that the supreme Self is bhavanakart® "agent of 
being/becoming". Torella translates (p. 122) "subject of the action of being", but this may 
not do full justice to the meaning ‘becoming’. 
[616] 
 It will be clear that Utpaladeva gives a new interpretation to the satkåryavåda and to 
the problem of origination. It fits his religious views, but has as inevitable consequence that 
God, or the real self, is an agent, in fact the only agent that exists. This turns the world view 
of Såµkhya and other philosophies on its head. For them all activity had belonged to the 
material world (which includes the mental world), whereas only the self remained 
untouched by actions. With Utpaladeva only the real self is agent, and nothing else. This 
must have two effects, one on the doctrine of karma upheld by Utpaladeva, the other on the 
liberating insight advocated by him. We will now turn to these. 
 With regard to karma we can be brief. The V®tti on kårikå III.2.5 observes that 
"[t]he karmic maculation, which pertains to the agent devoid of the light of consciousness, 
is due to the error of considering the cause of births and so on the actions, which on the 
contrary — as has been established — are not causes".17 The difference with Såµkhya etc. 
is evident. There the error was to ascribe the actions to the self, which in reality is free from 
them. Here, on the other hand, the error is to think that actions can be causes at all, even 
though the only real cause is the Lord. Karmic causality is only valid for beings devoid of 
the light of consciousness. Indeed, several kårikås of Section III chapter II specify this with 
regard to various beings, and kårikå 10 observes:18 "All the beings that are immersed in the 
flowing of existence, starting from the gods, are affected by the three maculations: but of 
these it is precisely the karmic maculation that constitutes the sole direct cause of the 
                                                
16 In fact, manifestations permanently reside internally, and exist only externally insofar as they are 
manifested as external owing to the power of måyå; so kårikå I.8.7. 
17 V®tti on kårikå III.2.5 (p. 199; Sanskrit p. 67). 
18 Kårikå III.2.10 (p. 202; Sanskrit p. 69). 
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saµsåra." Actions are effective on these lower levels, but in reality they are not causes. On 
the highest level there is activity, but this activity leads no longer to karmic retribution. 
Indeed, recognizing the agency of the self appears to be always accompanied by freedom 
from the karmic maculation. The Vidyeßvaras are mentioned in kårikå III.2.9 as a class of 
subjects that are endowed with agency, and have transcended the karma. 
 Does Utpaladeva still recognize a liberating insight, and if yes, what is it? It can no 
longer be the realization that the real self is not involved in any activity whatsoever, for 
here the real self is, quite on the contrary, involved [617] in all activity without exception. 
The earlier liberating insight cannot therefore be maintained as the only, and crucial, 
element. We have seen, and see again below, that Utpaladeva presents an altogether 
different liberating insight, which is rather close to the insight accepted by the Buddhists 
criticized by him. 
 Note however that at least one passage of the Áßvarapratyabhijñåkårikå mentions 
insight into the true nature of the self as liberating knowledge. The second half of kårikå 
III.2.2 reads:19 "once Science (vidyå) has made him recognize his own nature as Lord, then, 
his essence being solely consciousness, he is called ‘liberated’." The V®tti comments: "With 
the recognition of the true reality of the self attained thanks to Science he is free." But the 
concluding section IV offers an altogether different kind of liberating knowledge. It 
describes in much detail how the suppression of the mental constructs (vikalpa) leads to the 
highest goal:20 "With the suppression of the mental constructs, resulting from concentration 
on a single point, the plane of the Lord is gradually reached." "Permeated only by the 
reflective awareness of ‘I am this universe’, this creation of the Lord is free from mental 
constructs — since no differentiation arises within it — and it is manifested in all clarity. 
On this plane, by applying oneself and intensely cultivating those moments when the 
mental construct becomes attenuated, which occur sporadically while the activity pertaining 
to the limited subject is taking place, the beings in the power of the saµsåra gradually 
attain, through the emergence of the state of the Lord in all its fullness, the dissolution of 
the state of limited individuality."21 Similarly in the following verses of section IV. 
 Here, then, Utpaladeva presents a form of liberating knowledge that is very different 
from the "insight into the true (i.e. inactive) nature of the self". This other kind of liberating 
knowledge is precisely the one which Buddhism — which had always rejected the "insight 
                                                
19 Kårikå III.2.2 (p. 197; Sanskrit p. 66) 
20 Kårikå IV.11 cd (p. 215; Sanskrit p. 77), cited above. 
21 V®tti on kårikå IV.11 (p. 216-217; Sanskrit p. 78) 
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into the true nature of the self" — had come to accept. Once again we see that Utpaladeva 
has been profoundly influence by the Buddhists he criticizes. 
 Something remains to be said about the Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika school of thought. Here 
the self could be described as agent, but in a way which did [618] not jeopardize the 
"insight into the true nature of the self" as liberating knowledge. For here the self was 
conceived of as an omnipresent substance, which cannot, for that reason, undergo any 
movement. In that sense the self is inactive, and an insight into its true nature was 
considered a necessary precondition for liberation. However, this motionless self, being a 
substance, can be the substrate of various qualities. These qualities — more precisely the 
quality "effort" (prayatna) — allow the self to interact with its body, and indirectly with the 
rest of the material world. The self is therefore an agent, even though it never moves. 
Liberation implies that all qualities leave the self, which now reaches its real, inactive, 
nature. When Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika came to accept, and rationalize, the existence of a creator 
God, it conceived of him along the lines set out in connection with their soul theory, with 
this difference, that God was believed not to need a body in order to interact with the 
material world.22 
 It will be clear that there are points of similarity between Utpaladeva's description of 
the Lord and the creator God of Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika. Most importantly, both are, in very 
similar ways, agents. The activity of the Lord, that is, his being creator, — Utpaladeva tells 
us — consists in his power of volition (icchåßakti),23 not in any bodily activity on his part. 
In this respect the Lord's activity is similar to that of Yogins who, too, can produce pots etc. 
by virtue of their volition alone.24 But Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika accepts "insight into the true nature 
of the self" as liberating knowledge, whereas Utpaladeva appears only to pay lip-service to 
it and turns rather to the "suppression of the mental constructs". Why this difference? 
 The answer is not difficult to guess. Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika never denied, or rather 
emphatically maintained, the objective and independent reality of the material world, and 
therefore also the objective reality of karma. Utpaladeva, on the other hand, preached that 
actions are in reality not causes, and that only the mistaken conviction that they are is 
responsible for [619] the trouble they bring about.25 For Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika the task remained 
                                                
22 Chemparathy, 1972: 138 ff. 
23 V®tti on kårikå II.4.1; p. 55, 175. Cp. kårikå II.4.21: "Therefore causality, agency (kart®tå), action are 
nothing but the will (icchå) of Him who wishes to appear in the form of the universe, in the various 
manifestations of jar, cloth and so on" (p. 61, 187) 
24 Kårikå II.4.10; p. 57, 179. 
25 Utpaladeva's closeness to Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika is confirmed by Óhnika II.2 — which "aims at establishing that 
the categories acknowledged by the båhyavådins (the reference is particularly to the Nyåya-Vaiße∑ika) are 
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to escape from the effects of one's actions, for Utpaladeva the problem of karma had 
essentially disappeared. But liberation remained the aim, and insight was still believed to 
bring it about. 
 
Appendix 
 
 A number of misprints (or what seemed to me misprints) came to my notice while 
reading this book. Since their enumeration may be helpful to readers, or for a next edition if 
and when it is planned, I list them here. Note that no systematic search for errors of this 
kind has been undertaken, and that this list does not claim to be exhaustive in any way. 
 
A loose sheet called "Errata Corrige" accompanies the book. On this sheet itself I noticed 
two misprints: 
l. 2  p. XIV, fn. 3, l. 3   ➩  p. XIV, fn. 9, l. 3 
l. 7  p. 96, fn. 2, ll. 1 2 12 15  ➩  p. 96, fn. 21, ll. 1 2 12 15 
 
In the main text (= all except the Sanskrit edition) the following seem to be misprints: 
p. X l. 19:   ortodoxy   ➩  orthodoxy 
p. XII l. 23:  school    ➩  schools 
p. XIII l. 3:  af    ➩  of 
p. XXII l. 25:  such    ➩  such as 
p. XXIV l. 16:  toughtless   ➩  thoughtless 
p. XXV l. 23:  sleep into   ➩  slip into 
p. XXVIII l. 17:  eteronomy   ➩  heteronomy 
p. XXIX l. 13:  umpredictable   ➩  unpredictable 
p. XXXVI l. 30: Ahirbudnyasaµhitå  ➩  Ahirbudhnya° 
p. XLI n. 68 l. 1: His    ➩  Its 
p. XLIII l. 7:  naturale   ➩  natural 
p. XLVIII l. 26: simple    ➩  simply 
p. XLVIII l. 27: unvaluable   ➩  invaluable 
p. 85 n. 5:  note 2    ➩  note 3 
p. 96 n. 21 l. 12: 'bhidhåyadå˙   ➩  'bhidhåyakå˙ 
p. 112 n. 6 l. 2: k∑åˆikavådin   ➩  k∑aˆikavådin 
p. 115 n. 14 l. 16: rËpina˙   ➩  rËpiˆa˙ 
p. 116 n. 17 l. 1: °bhåsam   ➩  °bhåsanam 
p. 127 n. 45 l. 8: Noone    ➩  None 
p. 139 l. 5:  contraddiction   ➩  contradiction 
p. 139 l. 13:  rupyajñånå°   ➩  rËpyajñånå° 
p. 140 n. 12 l. 18: vivåk∑ito°   ➩  vivak∑ito° 
p. 142 l. 9:  rupaµ    ➩  rËpaµ 
p. 143 n. 18 l. 2 astidaµ   ➩  ast¥daµ 
p. 155 n. 8 l. 3: Chandogya   ➩  Chåndogya 
                                                                                                                                               
acceptable only if seen from the Íaiva viewpoint" (p. 157 n. 1) — and by the fact that he assumed "a 
Naiyåyika guise in the Áßvarasiddhi" (p. XXII). 
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p. 157 n. 1 l. 2 -Vaiße∑ka    ➩  -Vaiße∑ika 
p. 160 l. 9:  linked each   ➩  linked to each 
p. 164 l. 12:  lenght    ➩  length 
p. 165 l. 5:  maˆirupyådi°   ➩  maˆirËpyådi° 
p. 165 n 12 l. 9: bahudåpy   ➩  bahudhåpy 
p. 184 n. 27 l. 15-16 parapravanatå   ➩  parapravaˆatå 
p. 192 n. 11 l. 14: mahåmåya   ➩  mahåmåyå 
p. 192 n. 11 l. 17: Mahåmåya   ➩  Mahåmåyå 
p. 207 n. 30 l. 9: dvadaßånta   ➩  dvådaßånta 
p. 210 n. 2 l. 5: melana   ➩  melanå 
p. 212 n. 11 l. 2: ya sattå   ➩  yå sattå 
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